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Abstract: This study examines the relation between risk-based tax audit strategies and 
corporate tax avoidance. We exploit OECD data across 54 countries on risk profiling, predictive 
modeling, and internal intelligence functions in tax administrations from 2014 to 2017 to 
investigate whether risk-based tax audits have an incremental effect on tax avoidance beyond 
enforcement. Our results suggest that the use of risk-based tax audits is associated with lower 
tax avoidance when controlling for tax enforcement, firm-specific, and country-specific factors. 
Cross-sectional tests indicate that risk-based tax audit strategies are effective tools to curb tax 
avoidance across firms of all sizes. The results of additional cross-sectional analyses indicate 
that risk-based tax audits are more effective in countries with low governance quality, high 
GDP, and low trust in governments. In additional tests, we use country-level data on tax 
administration performance and find evidence that countries with a risk-based audit strategy 
have lower costs of tax enforcement and improve the performance of tax authorities. Overall, 
our findings indicate that risk-based tax audit strategies have an incremental effect on 
attenuating firms’ tax avoidance and increasing tax revenue. 
 
 
Keywords: tax audits, tax avoidance, tax compliance, tax enforcement, tax risk 
JEL classification: H25, H26, M41, M42, M48 
 
* We are grateful for valuable comments by Harald Amberger, Elisa Casi (discussant), Paul Demeré (discussant), 
Kris Hardies (discussant), Jeffrey Hoopes, Martin Jacob, Peter Krenn, Jonathan Leigh Pemberton, Richard Stern, 
Dirk Schindler, the participants of the 15. arqus-Jahrestagung 2019, DIBT Research Seminar at WU Vienna 2019, 
Paderborn University TAF Brown Bag Seminar 2019, WHU Brown Bag Seminar 2019, Seventh Annual 
MannheimTaxation Conference 2020, EIASM 8th Workshop On Audit Quality 2020, National Tax Association 
the 113th Annual Conference on Taxation (NTA) 2020, the 8th Annual Conference of the Tax Administration 
Research Centre (TARC) 2020, European Accounting Association 2021 Virtual Congress. We additionally thank 
Lars Andersen, Christina Dimitropoulou, Caroline Dupae, Ignacio Corral Guadaño, Marcio Henrique Sales Parada 
for providing information on tax administrations. Safaei, Sureth-Sloane, and Wu gratefully acknowledge financial 
support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) – Collaborative 
Research Center (SFB/TRR) Project-ID 403041268 – TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency. Eberhartinger, 
Sureth-Sloane and Wu gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): W 1235-





WU Vienna University of Economics and Business 
Email: eva.eberhartinger@wu.ac.at  
Caren Sureth-Sloane  
Paderborn University 
WU Vienna University of Economics and Business 
Email: caren.sureth@upb.de 
Yuchen Wu 
WU Vienna University of Economics and Business 
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich 
Email: wu@bwl.lmu.de 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3911228





We examine the relation between risk-based tax audit strategies employed by tax authorities 
worldwide to target high-risk taxpayers and corporate tax avoidance. Risk-based tax audits, if 
harnessed properly, can improve audit effectiveness and help tax authorities adapt to ever-
changing tax and tax risk environments. The incremental effect of risk-based tax audits on tax 
avoidance depends on taxpayers’ expectations about tax audits and thus tax authorities’ audit 
strategy, including the capacity to collect, probe, analyze, and detect potential non-compliance 
from various sources of data. Yet, it is unclear how risk-based tax audit strategies affect firms’ 
tax behavior.  
To fill this gap, we aim to explore whether and to what extent the employment of risk-
based tax audit strategies is associated with corporate tax avoidance. We make use of recent 
advances in the employment of risk-based tax audit strategies, specifically risk-profiling, 
predictive modeling, and internal intelligence, and employ country-specific data from 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to analyze the incremental 
effect of these strategies on firms’ tax avoidance beyond enforcement. Our results suggest that 
the employment of risk-based tax audits for audit case selection is strongly recommendable for 
tax administrations. Not only do risk-based tax audits reduce tax avoidance, but also, they reduce 
the cost of enforcement and improve the performance of tax authorities. 
Risk-based tax audits, in general, refer to advanced analytical techniques, which rely on 
a comprehensive dataset of taxpayers' characteristics such as information from tax returns, 
historical audits, and third-party information. The audit selection strategy is then based on 
statistical and automated machine-learning techniques to evaluate the risk of non-compliance. In 
2017, one-half of 53 tax administrations reported the use of risk-based audit strategies, such as 
predictive modeling and risk profiling to improve the match of audits and taxpayers' specific 
risks (OECD, 2017). Risk-based tax audits promise to improve audit case selection and 
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incrementally enhance the detection of non-compliance. As a consequence, risk-based tax audits 
may help to close the tax gap, which can be substantive. For example, the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) estimated the average annual gross tax gap for all the tax types (i.e., the difference 
between taxes owed and taxes paid) of $441 billion for the tax years 2011 to 2013 (IRS, 2019). 
Single-component selection strategies such as random audits seem less effective since 
the drivers of taxpayers’ compliance behavior are complex and vary substantially across different 
types of taxpayers (Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Jimenez & Iyer, 2016; Slemrod, 2019). 
Furthermore, as tax administration resources are limited, risk-based tax audits are assumed to 
improve audit-cost-effectiveness by devoting the resources to high-risk taxpayers with the 
highest potential for detecting non-compliance.1 For instance, since 2016, Canada has spent 
C$1.1 billion on a risk-based audit strategy (ITR, 2019)2 to help discover, identify, and target 
non-compliance cases. 
It is unclear whether tax avoidance—defined in line with prior literature as “any activity 
that reduces the firm’s explicit taxes in any manner, including tax positions that may or may not 
be challenged” (Lisowsky et al., 2013)—subsides when tax authorities implement risk-based tax 
audit strategies.3  A first intuitive prediction is that corporations revise their tax avoidance 
behavior in the face of upcoming changes in audit probability and effectiveness. Therefore, they 
may reduce risky tax behaviors, abstain from rather aggressive tax avoidance strategies, 
implement better internal tax control systems, and become more diligent in their tax assessment 
when risk-based audits are implemented.4 However, there are several reasons to expect that 
 
1 Risk classification is typically based on a combination of non-compliance factors: (1) firms’ inherent risk as a 
function of size, complexity, nature of business and prior compliance behavior, and (2) firms’ actions, attitude, as 
well as their internal control systems and processes to mitigate tax risk (HM Revenue & Customs, 2016). See HM 
Revenue & Customs 2016, https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/tax-compliance-risk-management. 
2 See International Tax Review, March 19, 2019,  https://www.internationaltaxreview.com. 
3 In prior literature, the terms “tax avoidance”, “tax aggressiveness”, “tax non-compliance”, and  “tax evasion” are 
all used to describe aspects of aiming to lower the tax burden.  
4 They can be informed about risk-based audit through public information, their experience, interaction with other 
firms, or tax professionals. 
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corporations are insensitive to risk-based tax audits. For instance, small firms or firms with an 
advanced tax compliance system might pay limited attention to audit strategies, while large 
businesses may face permanent audits and operate under continuous scrutiny, resulting in only 
marginal changes in their expectations of tax audits and audit strategies. Thus, these firms may 
not adjust their behavior in response to the employment of risk-based tax audits. Risk-based tax 
audits may even increase tax avoidance if firms start or improve anticipating the risk-based tax 
audit strategies and build on their own and tax intermediaries’ expertise to facilitate tax 
avoidance outside the scope of risk-based tax audits. 
To analyze the association between risk-based tax audits and corporate tax behavior, we 
exploit annual data on audit selection strategies across 54 countries from 2014 to 2017. The data 
is publicly available from the OECD Tax Administration Series. We use this data to proxy for 
risk-based audits and construct a binary measure depending on whether the tax administration 
explicitly reports that they employ either risk profiling (business rules), or predictive modeling, 
or internal intelligence function in their audit case selection criteria. 
Through our analysis of a cross-country panel of 15,920 firms from 54 countries between 
2014 to 2017, we find evidence that risk-based tax audit strategies are associated with a lower 
level of tax avoidance. We measure corporate tax avoidance by the cash taxes paid relative to 
the expected amount following Atwood et al. (2012)5 and control for the level of enforcement, 
i.e., the number of employees in tax administration, and for other country-level controls and 
firm-specific variables that might affect tax avoidance. In robustness tests, we use a difference-
in-differences design and compare the incremental changes in tax behavior of firms in countries 
 
5 Firms’ intentions about tax avoidance and tax evasion typically cannot be observed, and distinguishing between 
not-intended and intended tax evasion is notoriously hard. Therefore, in our empirical design, we cannot 
differentiate between tax planning activities as part of a firm’s compliant tax planning strategy that will be 
considered compliant in an audit and those activities that are requalified as tax evasion in an audit. 
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switching to a risk-based tax audit with those of firms in countries that never implemented risk-
based tax audits. These tests support our main results.  
In cross-sectional tests, we explore the heterogeneity in the association of risk-based tax 
audits and tax avoidance across firms and countries. We expect different tax behavior conditional 
on firms’ perceived audit probability, based on firm characteristics. Tax authorities, for example, 
often refer to firm size as a prominent indicator of a firm’s non-compliance propensity. We find 
that the deterrence effect of risk-based tax audits holds for firms of all sizes. Under risk-based 
tax audits, firms are not able to respond strategically by actively managing the magnitude of the 
key indicators below the threshold to avoid audits. Furthermore, cross-sectional analyses on 
country characteristics suggest that the employment of risk-based tax audits is more effective in 
curbing tax avoidance in countries with lower governance quality, higher GDP levels, and lower 
levels of trust in government. 
In supplementary analysis, we investigate the association between risk-based tax audits 
and the performance of tax administrations in different countries. We use three measures from 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Collecting Taxes Database 
(CTD) to proxy performance, namely the ratio of the total annual tax administration expenditures 
with the net tax revenue collected by the tax administration, tax administration’s raised tax 
revenue as a percent of GDP to country tax capacity, and the change of tax revenue relative to a 
change in GDP. All three measures indicate how effective a country’s tax administration is in 
raising revenue. Our findings suggest that the employment of risk-based tax audits for audit case 
selection reduces the cost of tax collection and improves the performance of tax administrations.  
We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we examine the incremental effect of 
risk-based tax audits beyond enforcement for corporations and extend the literature, which so far 
focuses on the effect of risk-based tax audits on individuals. We build on previous single-country 
studies on individuals (Alm & McClellan, 2012; Beer et al., 2020; Hashimzade & Myles, 2017; 
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Loyland et al., 2019) by studying corporations and a cross-country setting instead. The effect of 
risk-based tax audits may be very different across firms (Hoopes et al., 2012). Firms may be 
either more or less sensitive to tax audit strategies. Firms may respond differently to audits than 
individuals due to different social norms and networks (Hasan et al., 2017), different costs of 
non-compliance (Hanlon et al., 2005; Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009; Jacob et al., 2021), and different 
risk-taking patterns in their tax behavior (Armstrong et al., 2019). Moreover, firms face the trade-
off between financial and tax reporting decisions (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Publicly traded 
firms that are exposed to capital market pressure may value accounting earnings more than tax 
payments and thus give up tax avoidance opportunities to inflate financial earnings, with the 
extreme ones paying taxes on allegedly fraudulent earnings (Erickson et al., 2004). Moreover, 
we exploit the cross-country setting to alleviate generalizability concerns.  
Second, we contribute to the literature regarding corporate tax behavior (Atwood et al., 
2012; DeBacker et al., 2015; Gupta & Lynch, 2016). More specifically, we examine how the 
effect of risk-based audits is related to firm and country characteristics. By doing so, we aim to 
explore the determinants underlying the effectiveness of a risk-based audit, as suggested by 
Slemrod (2019). While the effect of enforcement through audit levels and penalties has been 
intensively studied, we investigate how the risk-based tax audits would incrementally affect the 
firm’s tax avoidance beyond the enforcement level. Moreover, we analyze how this effect could 
be different across heterogeneous firms and countries. 
Our results suggest that for a specific audit level, the risk-based distribution of tax audits 
across different taxpayers has an incremental effect in reducing their tax avoidance behavior, 
especially in countries with a lower level of governance quality, more developed countries, and 
countries with low trust in government. Also, the employment of risk-based audits is associated 
with a lower cost of tax collection and higher performance of tax administrations. Taken together, 
our findings suggest that risk-based audits contribute to a more efficient allocation of limited 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3911228




resources to risky areas and areas with the most potential outcome, in line with Slemrod et al. 
(2001).6 Therefore, we also contribute to analyses of the effectiveness of intervention activities 
(Keen & Slemrod, 2017) and answer the call for a re-examination of tax enforcement from 
DeBacker et al. (2015).  
2. Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Prior Research  
Individual tax behavior 
The economics of crime model (Becker, 1968) which is often applied to tax evasion, argues that 
the deterrence effect of enforcement is shaped by both audit probability and penalty (Allingham 
& Sandmo, 1972; Lee & McCrary, 2017). Based on this deterrence effect, a rational individual 
weighs the expected benefit of tax evasion against the expected probability of detection, post-
audit adjustments, and penalties. In recent years, the academic and policy interest in the relation 
between enforcement and taxpayers’ behavior has increased as enforcement is considered a 
crucial component to ensure tax compliance and combat evasion behavior (Slemrod, 2019).  
Prior research has demonstrated the link between the strategic behavior of taxpayers and 
tax authorities via tax audits. Kleven et al. (2011) show through an audit experiment conducted 
in Denmark that audits increase the self-reported income of individual taxpayers significantly in 
the post-audit year. In the same vein, Advani et al. (2019) investigate how audits affect reporting 
behavior in the years after audits. Using administrative data from the UK, they find that the effect 
of audits is likely sustainable, and audits increase the reported tax liabilities among self-
employed UK taxpayers for at least five years after an audit. Consistent with these findings, 
DeBacker et al. (2018) use IRS data and provide evidence that auditing increases the reported 
wage income of individual taxpayers over three years following an audit.  
 
6 As Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) point out, the optimal audit strategy is not the same as the revenue-maximizing 
strategy, so administrative costs of tax audits should also be taken into consideration. Slemrod et al. (2001) argue 
that resources should be allocated differently across taxpayers with different risk levels.  
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While the aforementioned archival studies provide an indication for a positive effect of 
enforcement on tax compliance among individual taxpayers, several experimental studies find 
opposite results. For instance, Mittone (2006) and Guala and Mittone (2005) show in behavioral 
studies that individual taxpayers increase their tax evasion subsequent to a tax audit, which is 
referred to as the “bomb crater effect”. This effect can be explained by the misperception of audit 
chance, in which individuals underreport income because they underestimate the risk of future 
examination since an audit has not happened for a while or has recently happened (Mittone et 
al., 2017).  
Corporate tax behavior 
Over several years, corporate tax avoidance has received heightened attention from tax 
authorities and the public. Prior research has provided mixed evidence on the relation between 
tax audits and firms’ tax avoidance behavior. Hoopes et al. (2012), examine how IRS monitoring 
affects corporate tax avoidance and find that when the probability of an audit is high, public 
corporations in the US engage in less tax avoidance. Gupta and Lynch (2016) examine the impact 
of changes in state-level tax enforcement expenditure and find evidence that higher enforcement 
expenditure is effective at improving aggregate state-level tax collection. Nessa et al. (2020) 
show a positive relation between IRS enforcement resources and aggregate corporate tax 
collection for large businesses and international corporate taxpayers. Atwood et al. (2012) 
investigate the impact of home-country tax system characteristics on corporate tax avoidance 
and provide evidence that firms avoid more taxes when their home country’s perceived 
enforcement is lower. These studies provide evidence that enforcement likely reduces firms’ tax 
avoidance.  
On the other hand, DeBacker et al. (2015) find evidence that tax audits may increase tax 
avoidance for corporate taxpayers. Using IRS data, they find that corporations in the U.S pay 
less taxes after an audit and increase their tax payments before they are re-audited. Their results 
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imply that corporations gradually become more tax aggressive following an audit and then 
eventually decrease their aggressiveness. This result is consistent with the bomb crater effect on 
individual taxpayers. Finley (2019), analyzes the effects of tax audits depending on the type of 
settlement the firms receive. Their findings indicate that subsequent to a favorable settlement, 
firms increase their tax avoidance, while firms with less favorable tax settlements stick to their 
prior tax avoidance strategies. Slemrod et al. (2001) argue that firms may behave like high-
income individuals and engage in even more aggressive tax avoidance when audit probability is 
high, to have room to negotiate and minimize their post-audit tax liability, assuming that the 
audit will not detect and punish all the tax avoidance. 
Reconciliation of individual and corporate tax behavior 
Taken together, while the majority of prior studies suggest that tax audits decrease tax avoidance 
and increase tax compliance, some studies, especially behavioral ones, indicate an opposite 
impact (for an overview, see Table A1 in the Appendix). One explanation for the mixed evidence 
is the misperceived probability of being audited. Tax audits increase rather than decrease tax 
avoidance when taxpayers underestimate the risk of subsequent audits (Kastlunger et al., 2009) 
or when enforcement is less effective than initially expected, i.e., non-compliance was not 
detected (Beer et al., 2020; Gemmell & Ratto, 2012). Another explanation is the effect of the 
non-linear weighting of probabilities: taxpayers may overweight low audit probabilities but 
underweight high audit probabilities (Dhami & al-Nowaihi, 2007). To attenuate this 
misperception of the audit probability and to make enforcement more salient, tax authorities can 
announce and implement a more effective audit selection strategy such as a risk-based tax audit 
strategy to focus on high-tax risk firms.  
Risk-based audit 
The effect of audits on the behavior of taxpayers seems to be attributed to the effectiveness of 
audits. For example, Gemmell and Ratto (2012) and Beer et al. (2020) report evidence that audits 
increase the compliance of previously non-compliant taxpayers, whereas they decrease the 
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compliance of previously compliant taxpayers. Kasper and Alm (2020) find that audit 
effectiveness is an important determinant of the specific deterrent effect of audits.  
 Little is known about risk-based tax audit strategies, especially for firms. Alm and 
McKee (2004) use an experimental approach to study individual tax behavior and find that the 
combination of risk-based and random audits is the most effective and sustainable mechanism 
in deterring individual tax evasion. Using administrative tax data of self-employed US taxpayers, 
Beer et al. (2020) find evidence that improved targeting audits toward non-compliant individual 
taxpayers increases current and future compliance. Further, two studies explore the features of 
specific methods of risk-based tax audits (predictive modeling, risk-profiling, and data mining) 
and their implications for tax revenues and individual taxpayer responses. Using an agent-based 
model and simulation analysis for individual behavior, Hashimzade et al. (2016) suggest that 
risk-based audits—more specifically, predictive analytics for audit selection—yield more 
revenue over random audits. Loyland et al. (2019) use Norwegian administrative data and 
empirically explore the individual behavioral responses of high-risk wage earners to audits. They 
find that the compliance effect of audits based on risk scores (predicted by machine learning) 
increases significantly with the individual taxpayers’ risk score. Noticeably, the existing 
evidence is on responses of individual taxpayers rather than firms. One exception studying the 
effect of risk-based audits on corporations is the case study by Hsu et al. (2015), who find 
evidence that the application of data mining in tax audits increases efficiency in the audit 
selection process in Minnesota. Summing up, theory and empirical evidence on the relationship 
between tax auditing and taxpayer behavior are mixed, and the existing evidence on the effect 
of risk-based audits on tax avoidance is more on individual responses. Therefore whether and 
how risk-based tax audits are related to firms’ tax avoidance remains unexplored. 
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2.2 Hypothesis Development 
Prior research has examined the reporting behavior of individuals who were selected based on 
random audits (Advani et al., 2019; DeBacker et al., 2018; Kleven et al., 2011). However, in 
reality, tax authorities worldwide rely increasingly on case selection systems based on risk-based 
tax audits, which target taxpayers with a relatively high likelihood of non-compliance (see Figure 
A1 in the Appendix).  
Firms consider and weigh the marginal benefits of their tax planning activities against 
the expected cost. They anticipate a potential tax audit that might impose costs upon detection 
of non-compliant tax avoidance behavior in the form of adjustments, fines, penalties, and 
interests. For their cost-benefit analysis, firms estimate the probability of an audit using the 
available information set and adjust their behavior accordingly. Risk-based audit changes both 
the actual and perceived audit risk.  
Firms can obtain information about risk-based tax audits in three ways. First, general 
information about audit case selection strategies is provided by tax administration to the 
taxpayers (especially for corporations) or the wider public. Second, in the course of a risk-based 
tax audit, firms may receive further information about the criteria of the administration’s risk 
assessment and experience how they are employed. Lastly, firms could attain information 
regarding risk assessment criteria and how they are employed by interaction with peer firms or 
indirectly through tax professionals who serve as an information hub (Battaglini et al., 2019; 
Hoopes et al., 2012). This information can also be diffused through social networks in the 
business process: for example, via financial analysts, audits, board of directors, banks, or via 
supply chains, executives or networks.7  
 
7 Three audit effects are identified in prior literature based on taxpayers’ information: induced, subsequent period, 
and group effects (Bloomquist, 2004). First, the induced effect explains the changes in compliance behavior as a 
result of changes in the enforcement level (for example, changes in audit level or audit rate) (see, e.g., Atwood et 
al., 2012; Mendoza et al., 2017). Second, the subsequent period effect describes behavioral changes in compliance 
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Tax administrations expect that the targeted focus of risk-based tax audits provides a 
strong deterrence effect for tax avoidance. By using risk-based tax audits, tax administrations 
allocate more resources to the high-risk taxpayer and thus incur lower opportunity costs. Audit 
effectiveness, as perceived by the firm, may increase. Thus, the likelihood of high-risk tax 
positions being scrutinized and, in turn, the inherent tax benefits being eliminated under risk-
based tax audits might give rise to more compliance. Unaggressive taxpayers will remain at low 
levels of tax avoidance to avoid a higher audit probability. Aggressive taxpayers may consider a 
future risk-based tax audit more likely, and reduce tax avoidance accordingly.  
Audit probability as estimated by firms, and the risk of detection of non-compliant 
positions under risk-based audits, also depends on the firm’s behavior in relation to their peers’ 
behavior. The larger the deviation of a taxpayer’s behavior from the average tax behavior of its 
peers, the higher the probability of being subject to a targeted audit. In other words, audit 
probability depends on both the firm’s tax strategy and its relation to the cumulative tax strategies 
across all firms. Thus, firms are expected to anticipate the actions of other firms to assess their 
own risk of being audited. This risk assessment is subject to substantial uncertainty. Hence, 
uncertainty-adverse firms will prefer safer choices and reduce tax avoidance. We expect herding 
tax avoidance behavior in order to reduce the risk of future audits (Tan & Yim, 2014). 
Consistently, Lediga et al. (2020) find that audits have a positive effect on tax reporting of non-
audited neighbor firms. To conclude, we expect firms to gather information about audit 
procedures enabling them to estimate their probability of audit and respond strategically to risk-
based tax audits. 
 
due to prior tax audits. The experience of being audited provides specific information to the taxpayers about the 
ability of the tax administration to detect non-compliance as well as the tax administration’s main focus. Lastly, the 
group effect refers to the changes in tax behavior of taxpayers appertaining to the communication and learning from 
the audit experience of other taxpayers and their peers. 
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Moreover, risk-based audits may also encourage other kinds of corporate responses. 
Some countries incorporate the existence or design of the tax control framework by firms in their 
risk-based audit selection criteria. Firms that expect to be subject to a risk-based audit may 
respond to this incentive by enhancing their tax risk management system and thereby induce 
both lower audit probabilities and lower tax avoidance (Chen et al., 2020). This practice may 
also make tax issues more salient within the firms as they learn more about tax risks and their 
management. Consequently, firms might anticipate tax risks and take actions to attenuate tax 
risks when making corporate decisions. 
Taken all together, when corporations learn about the use of risk-based tax audits and 
their effectiveness, they are expected to become less tax aggressive, implement better internal 
tax control systems, and become more diligent in their tax assessment. Based on this rationale 
and prior findings, we propose the following: 
H1: The employment of risk-based tax audits is associated with lower levels of tax 
avoidance. 
Although this prediction is both intuitive and in line with the literature, we expect that 
some firms are insensitive to risk-based tax audits for two reasons. First, small businesses may 
pay limited attention to tax audit strategies and are not able to draw differentiated conclusions 
from information on the employment of risk-based tax audits. Moreover, large businesses that 
are often permanently and comprehensively audited, might not expect to experience an increase 
in challenging tax issues under a risk-based approach. Thus, they might not adjust their tax 
behavior in response to the employment of risk-based tax audits. Furthermore, some firms 
participate in cooperative compliance programs and enjoy the benefit of no or less 
comprehensive post-filing audits. In all these cases, risk-based tax audits may have no or little 
effect.  
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Second, risk-based tax audits could also relate to higher levels of tax avoidance because 
firms may change their cost/benefit consideration when employing (new) tax professionals in 
the face of risk-based tax audits. Belnap et al. (2020) find that audited firms are more likely to 
change tax preparers.8  Some tax service providers, for example, the Big 4, use data analytics or 
artificial intelligence to assist firms in solving tax compliance problems automatedly. The service 
includes trend analyses and the timely detection of potential errors, risks, or abnormal conditions. 
Ultimately such service is expected to help firms better cope with risk-based tax audits. 
Consequently, firms may build on tax advisors/tax professionals' expertise in facilitating tax 
avoidance outside the scope of risk-based tax audits. In addition, firms in a country with more 
information about the key parameters or criteria in risk-based tax audits may behave strategically 
and use more tax avoidance techniques without triggering an audit.  
3. Data and Research Methodology 
3.1 Measuring Risk-based Tax Audits  
Most countries worldwide use risk-based tax audit strategies to determine their tax audit cases, 
combined with random selection. Countries disclose general information on their risk-based tax 
audit strategies on their tax administrations’ websites and in their report to the OECD. However, 
the exact details on audit case selection and risk criteria are confidential to prevent taxpayers 
from acting strategically (Khwaja et al., 2011).  
Table A2 in the Appendix provides general information about risk-based tax audit 
strategies in selected OECD countries. For instance, in Canada, the Canadian Revenue Agency 
(CRA) connects data from several CRA systems with a comprehensive dataset of taxpayers’ 
information (filing and assessment information, risk profiles, historical audits, collections, and 
appeal information) to determine high-risk taxpayers in SMEs. Then, the mining/machine 
learning algorithms, including cluster analysis, decision trees, neural networks, and deep 
 
8 The tax preparer’s effect on compliance is ambiguous and fosters a median stance (Marchese & Venturini, 2020).  
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learning, are employed to develop predictive models and to score and identify the highest risk 
taxpayers (OECD, 2019).  
To proxy for risk-based tax audits, we exploit information on audit case selection from 
the OECD database, published by Tax Administration Comparative Information Series, which 
provides internationally comparative data of fundamental elements of tax administrations in 
advanced and emerging countries.9 For details on case selection methods reported by the tax 
authorities to the OECD, see Table 1. The OECD reports 19 items for tax audit case selection; 
out of these 19 items, three are the most advanced and common methods for risk-based tax audits 
(Khwaja et al., 2011; OECD, 2004, 2017, 2019)10, which we use for our study: item (7) “risk 
profiling - business rules”, item (8) “risk profiling - predictive modeling”, and item (9) “internal 
intelligence function”. We argue that these three strategies out of the 19 disclosed by OECD are 
also the most relevant, representative, and explicit ones for risk-based tax audit selection. Other 
items, if used in risk-based audits, either serve as inputs of risk-profiling or represent specific 
rules or procedures (see Appendix Figure A1 for details).  
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
Our binary measure for risk-based tax audits equals one if the tax administration 
explicitly reports that they employ at least one of the three, risk profiling (business rules), or 
predictive modeling, or internal intelligence function in their audit case selection criteria. We 
use a binary indicator variable because it allows clear-cut interpretations. We do not use a 
continuous variable to avoid double counting. Although there is no information available on 
which kind of taxes these reported methods are used, we assume that tax authorities at least 
partially use these methods for corporate income taxes. To validate this measure on the use of 
 
9  OECD Tax Administration Comparative Reports Series, https://www.oecd.org/tax/forum-on-tax-
administration/publications-and-products/comparative/. 
10 There is no global definition of risk-based tax audits, and different countries may have different approaches and 
different understandings of the content of risk-based tax audits. In this study, we aim to find items that are generally 
accepted as risk-based tax audits (e.g., by OECD and World Bank) and comparable among countries. 
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risk-based tax audits by tax administrations, we compare our measure from the OECD reports, 
with tax authorities’ websites, PwC summaries, and the World Bank website for all the countries. 
Our additional search confirms the information in the OECD database for most countries. In case 
of disparities, we gather more information from tax authorities’ websites, check papers and 
reports written by employees in tax authorities or other insiders, and talk to tax officers of tax 
administrations and other experts such as tax advisors. After gathering the details of a country’s 
audit case selection strategy, we modify the dataset if the OECD data is inaccurate (for four 
countries). 11 The map of risk-based tax audits proxied by our revised dataset by countries can be 
found in Figure 1.  
< Insert Figure 1 about here > 
3.2 Research Design 
In order to explore the relation between the use of risk-based tax audits and tax avoidance, we 
estimate the following model using least squares pooling, where i denotes firm, j denotes country, 
and t denotes the year: 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =   𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑡 +   𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡       (1)            
 
The dependent variable is tax avoidance.12 We use the tax avoidance measure developed 
by Atwood et al. (2012), which is the difference between taxes calculated at the statutory tax rate 
 
11 We only change the data for risk-based tax audits from the OECD database for Germany, China,  Kenya, and 
Thailand. Risk-based audit indicators are missing for Kenya and Thailand for 2014 and 2015 in the OECD database, 
and we change it to 0 according to our hand-collected information. We correct the risk-based audit variable for 
Germany to 0 (Germany indicated as 1 for all four years in the OECD database), and  China, which should be 0 for 
all years (China indicated 1 for 2014 and 0 for 2015, 2016, 2017 in the OECD database). In the case of Germany, 
audit cases are selected based on size and industry. In the case of China, early actions to categorize taxpayers are 
based on size and industry. In July 2015, the State Tax Authority launched the "1,000 Enterprises Initiative", 
focusing on identifying the tax risks, assisting the enterprises to improve their tax control systems of the largest 
business groups in terms of size, turnover and tax contribution in China (including private enterprise, multinationals 
and all state-owned enterprises), and providing better service to reduce disputes. The collected data serves as inputs 
for risk profiling and modelling for different industries, supporting the tax credit rating for other taxpayers and 
helping to generate industry benchmarks. This "1,000 Enterprises Initiative" represents the start of the risk-based 
audit approach, and is only available for the biggest enterprise.  
12 We follow the definition of tax avoidance behavior in prior literature (Lisowsky et al., 2013), i.e., “any activity 
that reduces the firm’s explicit taxes in any manner, including tax positions that may or may not be challenged”.  
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and taxes actually paid. We follow De Simone et al. (2020) and calculate it as 
(pre-tax income ∙statutory tax rate)−current taxes paid
pre-tax income
, where pre-tax income (PTI) equals pre-tax earnings 
(PI) less special items (SPI) and current taxes paid (CTP) equals total tax expense (TXT) less 
deferred taxes (TXDI). Hence, Tax Avoid increases in increasing avoidance behavior of firms. 
This measure takes into account different statutory tax rates between countries over time and 
thus is suitable for cross-country samples. 
The variable of interest in our analysis is Risk-based Audit at the country-year level. As 
explained above, this binary indicator variable equals one if a risk-based tax audit strategy is 
employed and zero otherwise. As outlined in our hypothesis, we expect a negative relation 
between risk-based tax audits and tax avoidance. That is, we predict that the coefficient of Risk-
based Audit, 𝛽1, is negative for Tax Avoid. We also control for the enforcement level. We follow 
Alexander et al. (2020)13 and measure Enforcement as the total number of employees in tax 
administrations divided by the number of active firms (corporate income taxpayers) per country 
per year.14 To facilitate interpretation, the enforcement measure is multiplied by 100 so that it 
can be interpreted as the total number of employees in tax administrations per 100 firms. We 
replace the missing data for enforcement with the nearest observation following Alexander et al. 
(2020). Thus, we capture differences in human resources to perform tax audits at the country 
level, with higher scores of enforcement indicating stronger tax enforcement. Thereby, we are 
able to explore whether the employment of risk-based tax audits has an incremental effect on 
firms' tax behavior, given the level of enforcement. Similar to our main variable of interest, and 
in line with previous studies, we expect a negative relation between this enforcement proxy and 
Tax Avoid. 
 
13 They measured enforcement as the ratio of citizens to tax staff at the central government tax agency and convert 
this ratio into tax staff per 1,000 inhabitants. 
14 If the number of active taxpayers is missing, we replace it with the number of total taxpayers. 
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We include a set of time-varying control variables (𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), both at the country level and 
at the firm level, to alleviate the concern that the result is driven by other factors. The country’s 
GDP per capita and GDP growth as indices for market size and overall economic activity are 
used in the model. Furthermore, we include a set of control variables for firm characteristics. We 
control for firm profitability (measured by pre-tax ROA, prior loss, sales growth), leverage 
(measured by the sum of long-term and short-term debt), R&D (measured by R&D expense), 
cash holding (measured by cash and equivalents), all scaled over total assets. Pre-tax ROA equals 
pre-tax income divided by lagged total assets. We use firms' size (Ln assets) to control for 
differences in tax planning related to scale. These variables affect tax avoidance, according to 
prior literature (Edwards et al., 2016; Law & Mills, 2017). In addition, PP&E also indicates tax 
avoidance opportunities (Chen et al., 2010; De Simone et al., 2020). Furthermore, the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) are added into our regression. Lastly, we account for industry and 
year fixed effects in all regressions to control for unobservable tax-related differences across 
time and industry affecting our results. All variables are defined in Table A3 in the Appendix.  
3.3 Sample and Data 
We obtain the audit case selection and enforcement data from the OECD’s Tax Administration 
Comparative Series from 2014 to 2017 to construct our variable of interest, Risk-based Audit, 
and key control variable Enforcement. Furthermore, the statutory tax rate data is taken from 
KPMG Corporate Tax Rates Table15, which provides information on all corporate income taxes 
and related taxes on corporate profits across countries. We use other country-level control 
variables such as the annual level of GDP per capita and GDP growth from the World Bank.  
Our primary analysis from equation (1) is at the firm level. We start from all the firm-
year observations in Compustat North America and Compustat Global from 2014 to 2017 for 
 
15 See KPMG Corporate Tax Rates Table, https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-
rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html. 
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those countries with sufficient audit selection and enforcement data in the OECD series. 
Financial reporting data from Compustat Global are translated into US dollars using yearly 
exchange rates from the World Bank. We exclude firms with negative pre-tax income from our 
sample, following prior literature (Atwood et al., 2012). We drop all observations that do not 
have sufficient data to construct variables in equation (1). After our screening procedure, the 
final sample includes 45,762 firm-year observations across 54 countries between 2014 and 2017 
for firm-level regressions. Table A4 in the Appendix presents the sample selection.  
We add country characteristics representing the quality of governance from the WGI. 
The indicators consist of six dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability and absence 
of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control of 
corruption. Furthermore, we use tax administration and tax performance data from USAID’s 
CTD, which provides comparable information relating to tax administration systems in an 
internationally comparative context.16 The data is publicly available from the USAID DRM 
website.  
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample comprises both developed and developing countries. Table 2 reports descriptive 
statistics for Tax Avoid and STR by country. Countries with the most observations in our sample 
are from China (3,458 firms), followed by the United States (3,436 firms), Canada (827 firms), 
United Kingdom (760 firms). Firms from the United States and Malta show the highest tax 
avoidance, 0.176 and 0.115, respectively. In Comparison, Hungary and Portugal report the 
lowest level of tax avoidance. Table 2 reports considerable variation in the corporate tax rate in 
our sample, with the highest rate for the USA (40 percent) and the lowest rate for Bulgaria (10 
percent).  
 
16  USAID CTD was launched to promote tax system assessment and measurement as a means to promote 
improvements in tax policy and tax administration. See USAID COLLECTING TAXES FULL DATABASE 2019, 
https://www.usaid.gov/documents/1865/collecting-taxes-full-database. 
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< Insert Table 2 about here > 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for firm-level variables. We winsorize all firm-level 
variables at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. The mean (median) of tax avoidance is 0.032 
(0.063), indicating some level of tax avoidance in our sample consistent with prior research (e.g., 
Atwood et al., 2012). Sample firms report average (median) Pre-tax ROA of 8.9 (6.5) percent 
and Sales growth of 14.4 (6.8) percent. Around 10.7 percent of the firm-year observations show 
a prior year accounting loss. 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
Table 4 displays the Pearson correlations for our variables used to test our hypothesis. 
We observe a negative correlation between Tax Avoid and Enforcement. We note a positive 
correlation between Tax Avoid and Pre-tax ROA. We also observe a small but significant positive 
correlation between Tax Avoid and Sales growth, PP&E, R&D. Consistent with De Simone et 
al. (2020), the correlation between Tax Avoid and Statutory corporate tax rate (STR) is positive 
and significant, indicating that firms are more likely to avoid when the economic benefit is high.  
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
4. Results  
4.1 Main Result: Tax Avoidance 
We investigate whether and how the employment of risk-based tax audits is associated with tax 
avoidance at the firm level. Table 5 displays the results of our estimate of equation (1). Column 
(1) reports the results of our baseline model. We observe a negative and significant coefficient 
estimate for Tax Avoid, suggesting that the employment of risk-based tax audit strategies is 
associated with a lower level of tax avoidance. The coefficient -0.047 indicates that the 
employment of risk-based tax audits is associated with a 4.7 percentage point reduction in tax 
avoidance   
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Relatedly, we also observe a negative and significant coefficient estimate on 
Ln(Enforcement) in both columns, which suggests that firms engage in less tax avoidance when 
tax enforcement is stronger. This is consistent with prior literature (Atwood et al., 2012; Hoopes 
et al., 2012), which finds evidence of the effectiveness of enforcement to curb tax avoidance. 
With regard to other control variables, R&D is positively related to tax avoidance, consistent 
with Dyreng et al. (2017), and De Simone et al. (2020). This indicates that firms use R&D 
accounts for tax avoidance. 
In column (2), we add additional control variables at the country level to control for the 
effect of a country’s governance level: Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, 
Political Stability, Rule of Law, and Regulatory Quality. These variables reflect the citizen’s 
perception of participating in selecting the government, the quality of public services, the risk of 
political instability, the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society respectively, and the ability of the government to formulate and implement policies and 
regulations. A higher score indicates better governance of the country. We continue to observe 
a significant relation between Risk-based Audit and Tax Avoid after adding additional controls, 
which suggests that our results are consistent.   
To address potential concerns about the impact of the denominator in measuring tax 
planning for the dependent variable, column (3) additionally employs the variable One over Pre-
tax Profit (Edwards et al., 2020). We find consistent results when controlling for trends in tax 
avoidance by One over Pre-tax Profit. 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
4.2 Cross-sectional Tests 
Firm characteristics  
While the negative association mentioned above addresses the average effect of risk-based tax 
audits, the effect might vary across heterogeneous firms. In this section, we analyze the potential 
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heterogeneous effect of risk-based tax audits depending on the firm size, which usually is one of 
the audit selection criteria. The majority of tax administrations in advanced economies manage 
their largest taxpayers in Large Taxpayer Units (LTUs) (OECD, 2017). Firms are selected for 
LTUs based on specific size thresholds, including sales, income, total assets, taxable profit, or 
the number of employees (OECD, 2017). These size classes and thresholds differ significantly 
across countries.17 
It is unclear how large firms specifically react to risk-based audits. On the one hand, 
some countries employ risk-based audits in LTUs first and have a stronger focus on large 
taxpayers. In this case, large firms are expected to respond to risk-based audits more strongly 
than other firms. On the other hand, for those large corporations that are constantly audited, the 
use of risk-based tax audits should affect their behavior to a lower extent than others because 
under de facto audit certainty, targeted audits barely are expected to have an incremental 
deterrence effect (Ayers et al., 2019), or may even increase the incentives for uncertain tax 
avoidance (Mills & Sansing, 2000).18 However, large firms use complex financial instruments 
and arrangements that could be hard to detect under random audits, even with 100% audit 
probability. But under risk-based tax audits, not only is audit probability different, but audit 
intensity also differs. Tax administrations could improve the identification of high-risk taxpayers, 
high-risk cases, and non-compliance by the use of risk-based tax audit strategies.   
The effect of risk-based tax audits on small firms is similarly ambiguous. Bachas et al. 
(2019) find evidence that audit probability increases with the firm size. In addition, the audit 
intensity across different size classes also varies in terms of audit depth. Given that tax audits 
 
17 For instance, the German tax authority divides firms into four size classes, i.e., very small, small, medium and 
large based on revenue and taxable profit, while other tax administrations might differentiate between two size-
classes. 
18 Mills & Sansing (2000) argue that taxpayers are expected to claim more tax benefits under a permanent tax audit 
to create aggressive issues for negotiations with the tax administrations. These taxpayers assume that the tax 
administration in such a setting will not detect and punish all tax avoidance (Slemrod et al., 2001), which leads to 
higher levels of tax avoidance. 
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incur administrative costs for firms and could further lead to additional tax expenses or fines, 
firms strategically try to avoid tax audits. For instance, Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2018) 
find significant evidence on downward size management by Spanish firms and show that firms 
strategically bunch below a certain threshold to avoid stricter tax audits. Under risk-based tax 
audits, the probability and intensity of audits not only depends on size but on the combination of 
non-compliance factors such as complexity, business model, and firms’ prior compliance 
behavior. Therefore, we expect that risk-based tax audits have a deterrence effect on firms of all 
sizes.  
However, small firms may pay limited attention and are not able to draw differentiated 
conclusions from information on the implementation of risk-based tax audits. Conversely, it is 
also possible that they change their cost/benefit consideration in employing tax intermediaries 
under risk-based tax audits. These tax intermediaries provide technical expertise to implement 
tax avoidance schemes, which offset the deterrent effect of risk-based audits. Taken together, 
ex-ante it is unclear how the effect of risk-based audit differs across different size groups. In 
order to test the potential heterogeneous effects of different firm size groups, we split the sample 
into three size groups (Ln Assets) within country-year.  
Table 6 Panel A presents the regression results of equation (1) for the dependent variable 
Tax Avoid based on different sizes: small, medium, large. Interestingly, the results suggest that 
risk-based tax audits have a deterrence effect on all firms, irrespective of size. Moreover, the 
effect is more pronounced for medium and large firms, suggesting that risk-based tax audits 
increase control over the large taxpayers and improve the compliance of these groups. Note that 
Compustat only covers public firms, and thus small firms in our sample may already have a 
relatively larger size than private firms. As such, our result should be interpreted with caution. 
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Country characteristics  
This section examines how heterogeneity across countries could affect the association of risk-
based tax audits and tax avoidance. We first focus on countries' governance quality. High 
Governance indicates that the government is performing well in providing accessible and high  
quality public goods and implementation of policies. Countries with high governance might be 
more effective in employing policies and regulations and have better socioeconomic conditions, 
which do not necessitate using risk-based tax audits to curb tax avoidance. However, these are 
mostly the developed countries with a higher level of tax rates, which might incentivize firms to 
avoid taxes. Hence, risk-based tax audits might be effective in improving targeting audits toward 
non-compliant firms. Countries with a lower level of governance suffer from inadequate 
socioeconomic conditions, affecting citizens' willingness to pay taxes. In addition, these 
countries might be less effective in implementing the regulations and policies. Therefore, risk-
based tax audits could coordinate to target and identify the non-compliance cases.  
To analyze the effect of governance quality, we split the sample based on countries' level 
of governance provided by the six dimensions of the WGI (voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of 
law; and control of corruption). The results (Panel B of Table 6) are generally consistent with 
the idea that risk-based tax audits are more effective in curbing tax avoidance in countries with 
a low level of governance quality, which might offset the poor quality of governance in these 
countries. 
The effect of risk-based audits may differ across countries with different development 
levels. We split up the sample by GDP per capita, which represents the wealth effect. On the one 
hand, countries that are more economically developed might also have more developed risk-
based audit routines and, in turn, more effective procedures. On the other hand, these countries 
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might not suffer as much from budget constraints, and hence the pressure on tax administration 
to collect taxes might be less pronounced. 
Panel B of Table 6  represents the result of two subgroups: countries with high and low 
GDP per capita. Results indicate that the deterrence risk of risk-based audits on tax avoidance is 
more pronounced in countries with higher GDP levels. In columns (5) and (6), we split the 
sample according to countries’ level of trust in government. As indicated from prior literature, 
frequent auditing could be perceived as excessively and unnecessarily costly and may signal 
distrust, particularly for the honest taxpayers (Kirchler et al., 2008). We analyze how risk-based 
tax audits as a well-targeted procedure to capture tax-evaders will affect tax avoidance 
considering the level of trust in the government. We measure trust in government as the average 
score of perceptions of effectiveness and transparency of government policy indicators, 
following Mendoza et al. (2017). The results indicate that risk-based tax audits are more effective 
in subsiding tax avoidance in countries with lower trust levels in government.  
< Insert Table 6 about here > 
4.3 Supplementary Analysis 
Disaggregation of risk-based audit measure  
To further explore our measure of risk-based audit, we disaggregate and create a separate dummy 
variable for each component of our measure: risk profiling (business rules), predictive modeling, 
and internal intelligence function. This test partially alleviates the concern about our measure for 
risk-based audits. 
Results are shown in Table 7. Column (1) displays the results for the analysis of all three 
components, of which only predictive modeling shows a negative and significant coefficient. 
However, when analyzing each component separately in Columns (2), (3) and (4), each 
component variable is negative and significant (p<0.01). Our results show that the use of each 
of the three components is negatively associated with tax avoidance. We are thus confident that 
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our combined measure of risk-based audits in the main analysis is unbiased. These findings are 
intuitive and consistent with Hashimzade and Myles (2017) results, which show that predictive 
analytics are successful in raising compliance. 
< Insert Table 7 about here > 
Effect of implementation of risk-based audits on tax avoidance 
To alleviate the potential concern that the result is driven by confounding factors, we use a 
different identification strategy and focus on countries that implement a risk-based tax audit in 
our sample period. Using a difference-in-difference design, we compare the changes in tax 
avoidance for firms in countries that switched to risk-based tax audits (treatment group) with 
changes for firms in countries that never implemented risk-based audits (control group). 
China, Czech Republic, Germany, Japan, and Korea do not use risk-based audits between 
2014 to 2017. Georgia, Greece, Kenya, Thailand, and Turkey start to employ risk-based audits 
in 2016. The US started a risk-based audit in 2015; however, because tax avoidance of US firms 
is too different from that of other countries in our sample and may affect the parallel trend 
assumption, we exclude the US from the difference-in-difference test. Untabulated tests show 
that our result is robust when including US firms. Accordingly, 2014 and 2015 serve as the pre-
treatment years, while 2016 and 2017 serve as the post-treatment years.  
The model is as follows: 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑗𝑡 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝑖𝑗𝑡                    (2)                                    
Our dependant variable is Tax Avoid and our coefficient of interest is the interaction term 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡, representing the relative change in tax avoidance between treated and control 
firms. We include firm- and country-specific characteristics from our main tests. Our models 
also include indicator variables for firm fixed effects to absorb unobservable time-invariant firm 
characteristics and year fixed effects to control for common time trends.  
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Figure 2 indicates that before 2016—the year in which treated countries switch to risk-
based audit—there is a parallel trend in Tax Avoid between the treatment group and the control 
group.  
< Insert Figure 2 about here > 
Table 8 shows the results of our difference-in-difference specification. The negative and 
significant coefficient of Treat*Post suggests that relative to firms in the control group, firms 
reduce tax avoidance after a risk-based audit approach is introduced in the respective country. 
Our analysis confirms that the introduction of risk-based audits reduces tax avoidance. 
< Insert Table 8 about here > 
4.4 Tax Administration Performance  
Next, we use country-level analysis to examine the association of risk-based tax audits and the 
performance of tax administrations in different countries. We employ the data from USAID CTD, 
which compares the administrative frameworks, functions, and performance of different tax 
administrations.19 To test for the association between risk-based tax audits and tax administration 
performance, we estimate the following regression at the country level, where j is the country 
identifier, and t is the year identifier: 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡
=   𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 +  𝑗,𝑡       (3) 
Tax Admin Performance is one of three indicators: cost of collection, tax effort, and tax buoyancy 
which is described in detail below. All three indicators are collected and calculated by USAID’s 
CTD. Find descriptives of these indicators in Table A5 in the Appendix. Similar to our main 
 
19 For an overview of CTD comparable data on taxation, see https://www.usaid.gov 
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tests, we control for enforcement level and country characteristics, and we include year fixed 
effects. 
First, we use the cost of tax collection as the dependent variable to capture the 
effectiveness of tax authorities, as given by CTD. The measure for the cost of collection (Cost) 
is given by the ratio of the total annual tax administration expenditures (budget) to the net tax 
revenue collected by the tax administration (in percent). The lower this indicator is, the more 
efficient the tax system is in collecting all taxes. The cost indicator is affected by the revenue 
productivity of taxes.20 The data is available for two points in time over the sample period (in 
2015 and 2017). Therefore, we replace the missing cost of collection data for 2014 with 2015 
value and for 2016 with 2017 value.  
On the one hand, the employment of risk-based tax audits may increase effectiveness by 
devoting the resources to high-risk taxpayers. On the other hand, the employment of risk-based 
tax audits may trigger substantial costs in terms of data and IT systems at first, but the cost may 
outweigh the reduction in enforcement costs. Hence, the association between risk-based audits 
and the cost of tax collection is ambiguous.  
The results in column (1) of Table 9 indicate a lower cost of collection (-0.243) associated 
with the use of risk-based tax audits. The positive coefficient estimate for Enforcement suggests 
that the cost of collection increases with higher enforcement levels, i.e., more tax administration 
employees per 100 firms. This result is consistent with the OECD (2019), which shows that 
automated risk management informed by advanced analytics reduces the cost per audit 
substantially.  
Our second dependent variable Tax Effort, derived from CTD, is attributed to the 
performance of tax administrations and estimates the taxes a country could potentially collect 
 
20  Note, that this indicator does not take into account that some tax administrations rent the building or use 
government buildings and nationwide Information Technology (IT) hardware, or similar costs. 
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based on its macroeconomic, demographic, and institutional features. The Tax Effort indicator 
equals the actual value of tax as a percent of GDP to tax capacity (the potential tax to the GDP 
ratio). In other words, it indicates how much tax revenue a country collects relative to its tax 
capacity (predicted value of tax as a percent of GDP regarding several factors such as 
macroeconomic, demographic, and institutional characteristics of a country). For example, a tax 
effort of 1.0 shows that a country is collecting exactly its predicted capacity. A low tax effort 
(tax effort below one) indicates the opposite. We replace the missing data for Tax Effort with the 
nearest observation. We expect that the employment of risk-based tax audits will increase the 
extent that a country could collect tax revenue to its full capacity with respect to its characteristics. 
Results reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 9 also show that the use of risk-based tax audits 
by tax administrations positively affects the Tax Effort in a country and could facilitate the tax 
collection of a country to reach its full potential.  
The third dependent variable, Tax Buoyancy, again from CTD, provides insight on the 
extent to which tax collection responds to changes in the tax base measured by GDP. Tax 
Buoyancy is measured by the percent change of tax revenue (VAT, CIT, and PIT) divided by the 
percent change of the tax base or GDP. It is calculated based on 10-year rolling averages of the 
country’s tax performance and economic growth. Therefore, we examine whether the 
employment of risk-based tax audits is associated with higher tax buoyancy. We expect that the 
employment of risk-based tax audits by tax administration could increase the tax revenue in 
proportion to an increase in GDP. Column (4) of Table 9 presents the results of the effect of risk-
based audits on Tax Buoyancy. Specifically, the coefficient estimate on Tax Buoyancy is 
significantly positive. Hence, the employment of risk-based tax audits is associated with an 
increase in tax revenue at a faster rate relative to the growth in GDP. 
Overall, we provide evidence that the employment of risk-based tax audits for selecting 
the firms reduces the cost of enforcement and improves the performance of tax authorities. 
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< Insert Table 9 about here > 
5. Conclusion 
We conduct a cross-country study to explore whether and to what extent risk-based tax audits 
strategies are associated with firms’ tax avoidance after controlling for enforcement and other 
country characteristics. We use annual country-level OECD data on audit case selection 
strategies across 54 countries from 2014 to 2017. We measure risk-based tax audit strategies by 
the reported employment of risk profiling (business rules), predictive modeling, and internal 
intelligence function in tax administrations’ audit case selection criteria.  
Our results indicate that the employment of risk-based tax audits is on average negatively 
associated with corporate tax avoidance. We further exploit a difference-in-difference design 
and compare the tax behavior of firms in countries that switch to risk-based audits and firms in 
countries that never used risk-based audits (first difference) before and after the introduction of 
risk-based audits (second difference). The results are consistent with our main analysis and 
indicate that the implementation of risk-based audit strategies in a country affects firms’ tax 
behavior, i.e., reducing tax avoidance. In cross-sectional tests, we analyze firm and country 
heterogeneity. We show that risk-based tax audit strategies are associated with lower tax 
avoidance for firms of all sizes. That is, risk-based audits could potentially deter the strategic 
responses to audits, such as bunching below a certain threshold of revenue to avoid an audit. In 
addition, we show that the effect of risk-based tax audits is more pronounced in countries with 
poor governance quality, and low level of trust, and good economic conditions.   
In additional tests, we analyze whether risk-based tax audit strategies are associated with 
three specific qualities of tax administrations and find that the use of risk-based tax audits relates 
to lower cost of tax collection, to tax collection reaching its full potential, and to a 
disproportionately high increase in tax revenue as compared to GDP growth. Broadly speaking, 
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our results confirm the connection between the high performance of tax administration and their 
use of risk-based tax audit strategies. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first cross-country study to examine the 
association between risk-based tax audits and corporate tax avoidance. However, it is important 
to emphasize that we do not infer causality between the employment of risk-based tax audits and 
corporate tax avoidance behavior for most of the tests. Instead, we paint a consistent picture of 
the association between the use of risk-based tax audit strategies and tax avoidance, which tax 
administrations actively seek to combat. Note that we use cross-country data on risk-based tax 
audits. However, we can only refer to data on case selection strategies included in the OECD 
questionnaire and as self-reported by tax administrations. We mitigate this limitation by 
validating our measure with other available resources such as tax authorities’ websites, PwC 
summaries, World Bank reports, and contacting tax experts in different countries. Despite this 
limitation, we believe that our findings provide insights to researchers, policymakers, and tax 
administrations globally. 
Our findings enrich the debate on tax enforcement design. They underline the importance 
of investing in the analytical techniques of tax administrations to support advanced risk-based 
audit selection mechanisms. While several countries are well advanced in implementing such 
strategies, others seem to be rather reluctant to either free resources or overcome legal or political 
obstacles. Hence, our results provide important policy input for tax enforcement considerations 
in developed as well as less developed countries. Our results indicate that the employment of 
risk-based tax audits is also likely to deter tax avoidance in countries with poor governance 
indicators. More broadly, our results indicate that risk-based tax audits not only relate to less tax-
avoiding firm behavior but also to better performance of tax administrations.    
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Figure 1  
Risk-based Tax Audit across Countries and over Time 
Notes: This figure indicates the employment of risk-based tax audits across our sample countries between 2014 and 
2017. Countries highlighted in black employ no risk-based tax audit strategy, and countries shaded in grey employ 
risk-based tax audits. 
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Notes: This figure plots the difference in tax avoidance between treated and control firms. 2014 and 2015 serve as 
the pre-treatment years, whereas 2016 and 2017 serve as the post-treatment years. Treated firms are those whose 
countries switched to risk-based tax audits in 2016. Control firms are those whose countries do not use risk-based 
tax audits between 2014-2017—the parallel trend between the treated and control groups before 2016, supporting 
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Table 1: Audit Case Selection Criteria Reported to the OECD  
Notes: This table describes the audit case selection criteria as reported by the countries’ tax administrations to the 
OECD. Our measure of risk-based audits includes: (7) risk profiling - business rules, (8) risk profiling - predictive 
modeling, and (9) internal intelligence function. 
 
               Item Rating 
(1) Economic sector 
(2) Location 
(3) Taxpayer category 
(4) Ownership in a corporate entity 
(5) Taxpayer behavior 
(6) Frequency (time between audits) 
(7) Risk profiling - business rules 
(8) Risk profiling - predictive modeling 
(9) Internal intelligence function 
(10)Third party information  
(11)Commercial register 
(12) Collected tax 
(13) Significant changes to taxpayer 
(14) Audits as a result of BEPS or ATP issues 
(15) Audits as a result of international EOI 
(16) Tax control framework based “audits” 
(17) Compliance checks 
(18) Information cross-checking 
(19) Random Audit  
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
1 – Yes | 0 – No 
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Table 2: Mean of Selected Variables by Country 
Country Tax Avoid STR No. of Firms 
Argentina 0.013 0.35 55 
Australia 0.053 0.30 505 
Austria 0.010 0.25 59 
Belgium 0.049 0.34 79 
Brazil 0.057 0.34 191 
Bulgaria -0.063 0.10 37 
Canada 0.068 0.27 827 
Chile -0.057 0.23 108 
China  -0.001 0.25 3,458 
Colombia -0.079 0.27 30 
Croatia 0.052 0.20 49 
Cyprus -0.075 0.13 39 
Czech Republic -0.002 0.19 10 
Denmark -0.064 0.23 81 
Estonia 0.004 0.20 13 
Finland -0.069 0.20 112 
France 0.041 0.33 462 
Germany -0.019 0.30 418 
Greece -0.060 0.28 101 
Hong Kong -0.070 0.17 190 
Hungary -0.144 0.16 19 
Iceland 0.015 0.20 9 
Indonesia -0.080 0.25 297 
Ireland -0.088 0.13 58 
Israel -0.022 0.25 239 
Italy -0.115 0.30 236 
Japan 0.000 0.33 588 
Kenya -0.079 0.30 23 
Korea -0.006 0.24 8 
Latvia 0.042 0.15 18 
Lithuania 0.003 0.15 30 
Luxembourg -0.016 0.29 44 
Malaysia -0.068 0.24 457 
Malta 0.115 0.35 11 
Mexico -0.113 0.30 74 
Morocco -0.012 0.31 48 
Netherlands 0.004 0.25 114 
New Zealand 0.011 0.28 89 
Norway -0.033 0.26 102 
Peru -0.081 0.29 66 
Poland -0.010 0.19 520 
Portugal -0.130 0.21 38 
Romania -0.082 0.16 56 
Russia -0.059 0.20 177 
Singapore -0.083 0.17 447 
Slovak Republic 0.017 0.22 5 
Slovenia -0.007 0.18 22 
South Africa -0.021 0.28 166 
Spain -0.045 0.27 114 
Sweden 0.004 0.22 271 
Thailand 0.016 0.20 339 
Turkey 0.009 0.20 215 
United Kingdom -0.011 0.20 760 
United States 0.176 0.40 3,436 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Notes: This table describes the sample and summary statistics for the cross-country sample of our main variables 
for 15,920 firms and 45,762 firm-year observations from 2014 to 2017 used in the empirical tests. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75 
Tax Avoid 45762 0.032 0.318 -0.023 0.063 0.166 
Pre-tax ROA 45762 0.089 0.095 0.031 0.065 0.118 
Prior loss 45762 0.107 0.309 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sales growth 45762 0.144 0.392 -0.011 0.068 0.189 
PP&E 45762 0.303 0.266 0.085 0.235 0.454 
Leverage 45762 0.253 0.238 0.057 0.210 0.374 
R&D 45762 0.016 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.019 
Cash 45762 0.191 0.212 0.049 0.122 0.254 
Ln (Assets) 45762 6.266 2.183 4.902 6.193 7.639 
Risk-based Audit 45762 0.615 0.487 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Ln (Enforcement) 45762 0.505 0.826 -0.298 0.725 0.956 
STR 45762 0.283 0.075 0.250 0.250 0.340 
Ln (GDP per capita) 45762 9.982 0.951 8.897 10.544 10.861 
GDP Growth 45762 3.658 2.400 2.193 2.881 6.737 
Corruption 45762 0.790 0.946 -0.270 1.315 1.525 
Voice and Accountability  45762 0.241 1.213 -1.505 1.034 1.110 
Political Stability 45762 0.216 0.668 -0.499 0.336 0.678 
Government Effectiveness 45762 1.043 0.654 0.408 1.403 1.554 
Regulatory Quality 45762 0.869 0.852 -0.148 1.216 1.628 









Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3911228




Table 4: Correlations 
Notes: This table provides Pearson correlations for the sample. * denotes significance at the .05 level. 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1)Tax Avoid 1.000 
2)Risk-based Audit 0.019* 1.000 
3)Ln (Enforcement) -0.133* -0.279* 1.000 
4)Pre-tax ROA 0.115* -0.039* 0.002 1.000 
5)Prior loss -0.029* 0.105* -0.052* -0.121* 1.000 
6)Sales growth 0.037* -0.065* 0.023* 0.271* 0.092* 1.000 
7)PP&E 0.021* -0.003 0.030* 0.002 0.008 0.101* 1.000 
8)Leverage 0.027* 0.113* -0.110* -0.107* 0.070* 0.196* 0.245* 1.000 
9)R&D 0.037* -0.166* 0.048* 0.186* 0.004 0.118* -0.174* -0.153* 1.000 
10)Cash 0.005 -0.225* 0.048* 0.408* -0.025* 0.246* -0.173* -0.200* 0.331* 1.000 
11)Ln (Assets) 0.044* -0.030* -0.204* -0.171* -0.104* -0.033* 0.098* 0.273* -0.087* -0.192* 1.000 
12)STR 0.230* 0.045* -0.526* -0.007 0.024* -0.042* -0.086* 0.131* 0.068* -0.072* 0.289* 1.000 
13)Ln (GDP per capita) 0.133* 0.509* -0.376* -0.066* 0.105* -0.075* -0.113* 0.130* -0.023* -0.183* 0.183* 0.454* 1.000 
14)GDP Growth -0.077* -0.580* 0.359* 0.059* -0.108* 0.092* 0.040* -0.127* 0.111* 0.232* -0.094* -0.378* -0.676* 1.000 
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Table 5: Risk-based Tax Audits and Tax Avoidance 
Notes: This table presents the results of equation (1). The dependent variable is Tax Avoid, measured as the difference 
between taxes calculated at the statutory tax rate and taxes that are actually paid, based on De Simone et al. (2020) and 
Atwood et al. (2012). Our main variable of interest, Risk-based Audit, is an indicator variable equal to one if risk 
profiling - business rules, risk profiling - predictive modeling, or internal intelligence function equal to one from OECD 
audit case selection data. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Variables are defined in 
Table A3. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. We report robust standard errors clustered at 
the country level in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Tax Avoid Tax Avoid Tax  Avoid 
Risk-based Audit -0.047*** -0.040*** -0.040*** 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) 
Ln (Enforcement) -0.032** -0.026** -0.026** 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) 
Pre-tax ROA 0.427*** 0.412*** 0.402*** 
 (0.083) (0.090) (0.090) 
Prior loss -0.025** -0.028** -0.027** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Sales growth 0.011** 0.014** 0.014** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
PP&E 0.065*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) 
Leverage -0.028 -0.039 -0.037 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) 
R&D 0.350*** 0.222*** 0.225*** 
 (0.095) (0.081) (0.079) 
Cash -0.060** -0.051** -0.050** 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) 
Ln (Assets) -0.002 -0.004** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln (GDP per capita) 0.044*** 0.037* 0.038* 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) 
GDP Growth 0.002 0.006 0.006 







Voice and Accountability   -0.015 -0.015 
  (0.014) (0.013) 
Government Effectiveness  -0.083* -0.085* 
  (0.047) (0.047) 
Political Stability  -0.041* -0.041* 
  (0.022) (0.022) 
Rule of Law  0.302*** 0.303*** 
  (0.058) (0.059) 
Regulatory Quality  -0.124*** -0.123*** 
  (0.029) (0.029) 
One over Pre-tax Profit   -0.002** 
   (0.001) 
Constant -0.485*** -0.397* -0.401* 
  (0.178) (0.199) (0.201) 
Observations 45,762 45,762 45,762 
R-squared 0.077 0.093 0.097 
Industry FE yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes 
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Table 6: Cross-sectional Tests 
Notes: This table presents the cross-sectional results of estimating the baseline regression (Table 5). The dependent 
variable is Tax Avoid, measured as the difference between taxes calculated at the statutory tax rate and taxes that are 
actually paid, based on De Simone et al. (2020) and Atwood et al. (2012). Our main variable of interest, Risk-based 
Audit, is an indicator variable equal to one if risk profiling - business rules, risk profiling - predictive modeling, or 
internal intelligence function equal to one from OECD audit case selection data. In Panel A, the results of equation (1) 
are split by size quantile per country and year. In Panel B, Columns (1) and (2) present the results using a subsample of 
companies that are located in countries with low and high Governance indicators (voice and accountability, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption). Columns (3) and (4) present 
the result of equation (1) split by GDP per capita. Columns (5) and (6) present results using a subsample of firms in 
countries with low and high trust in government. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Variables are defined in Table A3. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. We report robust 
standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Risk-based Tax Audit and Firm Size 








Risk-based Audit -0.031** -0.046*** -0.040*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) 
Ln (Enforcement) -0.022** -0.021** -0.028** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) 
Observations 15,320 15,260 15,182 
R-squared 0.078 0.100 0.143 
Controls yes yes Yes 
Industry FE yes yes Yes 
Year FE yes yes Yes 
Panel B: Risk-based Tax Audit and Country Characteristics 















Risk-based Audit -0.050*** -0.038 -0.046** -0.053*** -0.050** -0.025* 
 (0.012) (0.023) (0.017) (0.012) (0.023) (0.014) 
Ln (Enforcement) -0.024** -0.031*** -0.001 -0.046*** -0.008 -0.021** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) 
Observations 29,079 16,683 20,166 25,596 10,945 34,817 
R-squared 0.088 0.109 0.061 0.120 0.055 0.112 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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Table 7: Supplementary Analysis - Alternative Measure of Risk-based Tax Audit 
Notes: This table presents the results of equation (1) with alternative measures of risk-based tax audits. The dependent 
variable is Tax Avoid, measured as the difference between taxes calculated at the statutory tax rate and taxes that are 
actually paid, based on De Simone et al. (2020) and Atwood et al. (2012). The variables of interest are the components 
of risk-based tax audits: risk profiling (business rules), predictive modeling, and internal intelligence function. Risk 
profiling (business rules), predictive modeling, and internal intelligence function are dummy variables from OECD 
audit case selection data. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Variables are defined in 
Table A3. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. We report robust standard errors clustered at 
the country level in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Tax Avoid Tax Avoid Tax Avoid Tax Avoid 
Risk profiling-business rules -0.001 -0.031**   
 (0.023) (0.012)   
Risk profiling-predictive modeling -0.038**  -0.041***  
 (0.019)  (0.014)  
Internal intelligence -0.006   -0.031*** 
 (0.023)   (0.011) 
Ln (Enforcement) -0.021** -0.026** -0.020** -0.025** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Observations 45,762 45,762 45,762 45,762 
R-squared 0.094 0.092 0.094 0.092 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Industry FE yes yes yes yes 
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Table 8: Difference-in-difference 
Notes: This table presents regression results for the difference-in-differences test, which compares the countries that 
switch to a risk-based audit in our sample with countries that do not employ risk-based tax audits. The dependent 
variable is Tax Avoid, and the coefficient of interest is the interaction term Treat*Post, representing the relative change 
in tax avoidance between treated and control firms. We include firm- and country-specific characteristics that are used 
in our primary tests. Our models also include indicator variables for firm fixed effects to absorb unobservable time-
invariant firm characteristics and year fixed effects to control for common time trends. We report robust standard errors 




  (1) 
Variables Tax Avoid 
Treat*Post -0.030** 
 (0.015) 
Ln (Enforcement) -3.278 
 (2.503) 
Pretax ROA  0.525***  
(0.061) 
Prior loss 0.001  
(0.017) 
Sales growth 0.017** 
 (0.008) 
PP&E -0.053**  
(0.027) 




Cash -0.037***  
(0.013) 
Ln (Assets) -0.004 
 (0.010) 
Ln (GDP per capita) 0.039 
 (0.149) 









Number of firm 5,131 
Firm FE yes 
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Table 9: Risk-based Tax Audit and Tax Administration Performance 
Notes: This table presents the results of equation (3). In column (1), the dependent variable is Cost, which equals the 
ratio of the cost of administering the tax system to the total revenues collected by the tax administration. In columns (2) 
and (3), the dependent variable is Tax Effort, which compares the actual value of tax as a percent of GDP to tax capacity. 
In column (4), the dependent variable is Tax Buoyancy, which equals the percent change of tax revenue divided by the 
percent change of the tax base or GDP. Our main variable of interest, Risk-based Audit, is an indicator variable equal to 
one if risk profiling - business rules or risk profiling - predictive modeling or internal intelligence function equal to one 
from OECD audit case selection data. Variables are defined in Table A3. Year fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. We report robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 






Risk-based Audit -0.243** 0.051* 0.075** 0.075* 
 (0.108) (0.029) (0.033) (0.040) 
Ln (Enforcement) 0.108*** 0.030 0.026 0.010 
 (0.036) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) 
Voice and Accountability 0.316*** 0.035 0.020 0.106* 
 (0.109) (0.037) (0.040) (0.053) 
Political Stability 0.158* -0.037 -0.092*** 0.026 
 (0.089) (0.028) (0.024) (0.041) 
Government Effectiveness 0.852*** -0.185** -0.178* 0.213 
 (0.275) (0.082) (0.105) (0.164) 
Regulatory Quality -0.134 -0.147*** -0.140*** -0.010 
 (0.215) (0.051) (0.051) (0.113) 
Rule of Law -0.577* 0.049 0.152 -0.138 
 (0.313) (0.072) (0.099) (0.136) 
Corruption 0.022 0.159** 0.096 -0.092 
 (0.190) (0.060) (0.075) (0.089) 
Ln (GDP per capita) -0.409*** 0.089** 0.079** 0.006 
 (0.125) (0.035) (0.036) (0.046) 
GDP Growth -0.007 -0.009** -0.015** -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
Constant 4.623*** -0.190 -0.118 -0.132 
 (1.151) (0.308) (0.311) (0.405) 
Observations 196 200 68 216 
R-squared 0.412 0.498 0.559 0.099 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
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Table A1: Association between Tax Audits and Individual or Corporate Tax Compliance in 
Prior Literature 
 Individual tax behavior Corporate tax behavior 
Positive association between 
tax audits and compliance 
Kleven et al. (2011) 
Advani et al. (2019) 
DeBacker et al. (2018) 
Hoopes et al. (2012) 
Gupta and Lynch (2016) 
Atwood et al. (2012) 
Negative association between 
tax audits and compliance 
Mittone (2006)  
Guala & Mittone (2005) 
DeBacker et al. (2015) 
Finley (2019) 
Negative association between 
risk-based tax audits and 
compliance 
Alm and McKee (2004) 
Beer et al. (2020) 
Hashimzade et al. (2016) 
Loyland et al. (2019) 
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Table A2: Risk-based Tax Audit Strategies across Selected OECD Countries  
Country Risk-based tax audits 
Australia The Australian Tax Office uses a risk-based approach to increase the 
detection capability of the revenue authority. It employs a range of 
activities aimed at preventing, deterring, detecting, and dealing with the 
risks of non-compliance. This risk-based approach includes techniques 
such as qualitative, quantitative assessment and probability forecasts using 
predictive techniques. 
Austria Austria uses risk analysis systems using tax returns and case history 
information and evaluates/compares this information to assign risk levels 
to each taxpayer. 
Bulgaria Risk analysis and risk criteria at the national level. In Bulgaria, past 
taxpayer data, supplemented with external data, are gathered to create risk 
scores and categories. The risk assessment employs the point systems, 
which generate points based on different criteria and determines the 
taxpayers' total risk score. 
Canada Audit selection based on data-mining techniques (neural networks, 
decision trees). In Canada, data is extracted from several systems to 
identify the high-risk taxpayers in the Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SME) population. Data mining/machine learning algorithms, including 
cluster analysis, decision trees, neural networks, and deep learning, are 
used in developing SME predictive models for income. 
France Audit selection is based on data mining and other statistical tools. 
Malaysia Data-driven audit case selection (automated audit selection). The risk-
based audit techniques also include advanced analytics using statistical 
models. 
Netherlands Dutch Tax and Customs Administration gathers and analyzes many types 
of information at the central level, including the industry sector-related 
information, information from tax returns, compliance surveys, risk 
database, third-party information, and information from other authorities. 
It employs risk-based approaches, such as data-matching and advanced 
analytics. 
Sweden In Sweden, risk-based tax audits are employed using data at both central 
and regional levels. The risk-based tax audit techniques include data-
matching and predictive techniques such as predictive models to identify 
unreported income. 
Turkey Risk-based audits are centralized at the national level. Risk-based audit 
techniques are based on data mining. 
United Kingdom HM Revenue and Customs employ extensive data-matching and data-
mining techniques (including decision trees and neural networks), score-
based risk assessment using statistical tools. 
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Table A3: Variable Definition 
Panel A: Firm-level variables 
Variable  Definitions Source 
Tax Avoid   [(PTI * Statutory Tax Rate) - CTP] / PTI, 
where PTI = pre-tax earnings (PI) less special 
items (SPI), STR is the combined average 
statutory corporate income tax rate at all 
layers of government in the country during 
the year t, obtained from KPMG, and CTP = 
current taxes paid, measured as total tax 
expense (TXT) less deferred taxes (TXDI). 
Based on De Simone et al. (2020) and 
Atwood et al. (2012). 
Compustat  
 
Pre-Tax ROA  Pre-tax Income (PI) scaled by lagged total 
assets (AT).  
Compustat  
Prior Loss A dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm had 
negative Pre-Tax ROA in the previous year 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
Sales Growth  Percentage change in Sales (SALE) from 
year t-1 to year t.  
Compustat 
PP&E Net property, plant, and equipment 
(PP&ENT) scaled by lagged total assets 
(AT). 
Compustat 
Leverage  Sum of long-term and short-term debt, scaled 




R&D Expense in year t scaled by lagged total 
assets, set to zero if missing. 
Compustat 
Cash Cash and equivalents scaled by lagged total 
assets, set to zero if missing. 
Compustat 
Ln Assets Natural log of total assets. Compustat 
Panel B: Country-level variables 
Variable  Definitions Source 
Risk-based Audit  An indicator variable equal to one if risk 
profiling - business rules or risk profiling - 
predictive modeling or Internal intelligence 






Enforcement  The number of full-time employees in tax 
administration/total number of active firms 
(corporate income taxpayers) multiplied by 
100. If the number of active taxpayers is 






Statutory tax rate  The average statutory corporate income tax 
rate in the country at year t. 
KPMG 
Ln (GDP per capita) 
 
Natural logarithm of per-capita GDP. World Bank 
GDP Growth The percentage change in GDP in a country 
from year t-1 to t. 
World Bank 
Corruption A yearly estimate of perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption. 
World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
(WGI) 
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A yearly estimate of the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media. 
World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
(WGI) 
Political Stability A yearly estimate of citizens perception of  
the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically motivated violence and terrorism. 





A yearly estimate which captures perceptions 
of the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 
World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
(WGI) 
Regulatory Quality Yearly estimate which captures the 
perception of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement policies and 
regulations. 
World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
(WGI) 
Rule of Law Yearly estimate which captures perceptions 
of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence. 
World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
(WGI) 
Trust The average score of  “government decisions 
are effectively implemented” measure and 
“transparency of government policy”, 
following Mendoza et al. (2017). 
World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
(WGI) 
Governance Composite governance index of country’s  
combined WGI measures: voice and 
accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
control of corruption  
World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
(WGI) 
Cost The ratio of the cost of administering the tax 
system to the total revenues collected by the 
tax administration.  
It is expressed as a percentage or as the cost 
of collecting 100 currency units of tax 
revenue. 
USAID’s Collecting Taxes 
Database (CTD) 
Tax Effort Yearly estimate compares the actual value of 
tax as a percent of GDP to tax capacity 
(predicted value of tax as a percent of GDP 
considering macroeconomic, demographic, 
and institutional characteristics of a country). 
USAID’s Collecting Taxes 
Database (CTD) 
Tax Buoyancy The percent change of tax revenue divided by 
the percent change of the tax base or GDP. 
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Table A4: Sample Selection 
Notes: This table describes the sample selection. Panel A presents the sample selection at the country level over the 
period from 2014 to 2017. Panel B presents the sample selection at the firm level. 
 
Panel A: Country level 
Step Description No. of Observation 
1 Countries with OECD data 58 
2 Less country observations without sufficient data for variables 54 
     
   
Panel B: Firm level 
Step Description No. of Observation 
1 Compustat 2014-2017 192,171 
2 Merge with country level data  184,984 
3 Less firm observations without positive pre-tax income 145,837 
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Table A5: Descriptive Statistics - Tax Administration Performance 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75 
Cost 204 0.865 0.507 0.567 0.711 1.068 
Tax Effort without Imputation 70 0.556 0.143 0.471 0.559 0.656 
Tax Effort with Imputation 208 0.577 0.140 0.485 0.567 0.659 
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Figure A1: Example of the Risk-based Audit Measure and other Items in OECD Audit Case 
Selection Strategies 
Notes: This figure exemplifies how both data from different databases (e.g., data from tax returns and third party 
information) available in tax authorities and advanced analytical techniques are used for risk-based tax audits. Numbers 
represent OECD audit case selection items (1) to (18) as available in the OECD's Tax Administration Comparative 
Information Series 2014 to 2019. Overall, the OECD data covers 19 items on audit case selection strategies: (1) 
Economic sector, (2) Location, (3) Taxpayer category, (4) Ownership in a corporate entity, (5) Taxpayer behavior, (6) 
Frequency (time between audits), (7) Risk profiling - business rules, (8) Risk profiling - predictive modeling, (9) 
Internal intelligence function, (10) Third party information, (11) Commercial register, (12) Collected tax, (13) 
Significant changes to taxpayer, (14) Audits as a result of BEPS or ATP issues, (15) Audits as a result of international 
EOI, (16) Tax control framework based “audits”, (17) Compliance checks, (18) Information cross-checking, and (19) 
Random Audit. The items (1) to (6), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18) from the OECD case selection data 
describe taxpayers' characteristics. Statistical and machine-learning techniques are used to analyze the data from 
different databases. Advanced analytical techniques such as clustering and association analysis, risk profiling, decision 
trees, regressions, and predictive models are employed to trace and identify risky cases and to evaluate non-compliance. 
Our measure of risk-based audits builds on a selection of these items and includes (7) Risk profiling - business rules, (8) 
Risk profiling - predictive modeling, and (9) Internal intelligence function, which are the most relevant, representative, 
and explicit ones for the process of applying the statistical and automated machine-learning technique that are generally 
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